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1. INTRODUCTION
Regional development has not been 
a major policy focus in the broad 
landscape of the first 15 years of 
development planning undertaken 
in South Africa after the democratic 
transition (Harrison, Todes & Watson, 
2008; Nel & Rogerson, 2009). Robbins 
(2008: 6) points to the limited extent to 
which spatially referenced elements 
have been incorporated in major 
national economic development poli-
cies or frameworks. Since 1994 initiatives 
linked to regional development have 
been fragmentary in nature rather 
than a cohesive and comprehensive 
project. Relevant government policy 
initiatives have included, inter alia, the 
programme for Spatial Development 
Initiatives, encompassing the establish-
ment of Industrial Development Zones; 
the launch of a number of regional and 
provincial development agencies; the 
development of the National Spatial 
Development Perspective and, perhaps 
most importantly, the pursuit of a suite 
of initiatives designed to energise local 
economic development programming 
(Nel & Rogerson, 2005; Harrison et al., 
2008; Robbins, 2008; Nel & Rogerson, 
2009; Rogerson, 2010).
The limited attention devoted to 
spatial issues and regional develop-
ment since the democratic transition 
of 1994 stands in sharp contrast to 
the apartheid period when regional 
development planning represented 
a critical dimension for government 
planning, not least because it was 
inextricably linked to broader spatial 
planning for the apartheid project 
(Tomlinson & Addleson, 1987). During 
the late apartheid period, the heart of 
policy implementation was the initiation 
of generous regional development 
funds and application of incentives 
designed to encourage manufacturers 
to relocate their production operations 
from the country’s major cities into the 
‘new industrial spaces’ that were to be 
opened up in rural decentralised areas 
and, in particular, in the impoverished 
Bantustans or Homelands (Pickles, 1991; 
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HEROORWEEG DIE ROL VAN STREEKSONTWIKKELINGSFONDSE IN SUID-
AFRIKA: REFLEKSIE OP INTERNASIONALE ERVARING 
In 2010 was die bekendstelling van ‘n streeksontwikkelingsfonds om die doelwitte van 
streeksontwikkeling in Suid-Afrika te ondersteun aktief oorweeg deur die nasionale 
regering. Teen hierdie agtergrond gee hierdie artikel ‘n oorsig oor die historiese 
toepassing van streeksvergoeding onder apartheid en die huidige internasionale toe-
passing van streeksontwikkelingsfondse. Daar word geargumenteer dat ‘n klein fokus 
op streeksvergoedingsfondse ‘n element van die ‘ou’ paradigma van streeksteorie- en 
streeksontwikkelingspraktyke verteenwoordig. In die aanspreek van die wye onge-
balanseerdhede wat in die ruimte-ekonomie van kontemporêre Suid-Afrika bestaan, is 
dit wys om die toepassing van ‘streeksontwikkelingsfondse’ te koppel aan die moderne 
paradigma van streeksontwikkelingsbeplanning. Binne hierdie raamwerk, is die streek-
ontwikkelingsfonds nie meer slegs ‘n besigheidsgeoriënteerde fonds gesentreerd vir 
vervaardiging nie. In teendeel, die streeksfonds is herdefinieer as ‘n kanaal om wyer 
alomvattende ingryping tussen verskeie sektore te ondersteun en word geoormerk om 
streeksmededinging te bou.
HO TADIMA HAPE MOSEBETSI WA MATLOLE A NTSHETSOPELE A LEBATOWA 
HO LA AFRIKA BORWA: TSE HLAHELANG MABAPI LE DIKETSAHALO TSA 
LEFATSHE LOHLE
Ka selemo sa 2010 ho kenngwa tshebetsong ha letlole la ntshetsopele la lebatowa ho 
tshehetsa maikemisetso a ntshetsopele ya lebatowa ho la Afrika Borwa ho ileng ha bewa 
leihlo haholo ke mmuso wa setjhaba. Tshallong morao ena, pampiri ena e tadima hape 
ka thata tshebediso ya dilemo tse fetileng ya ditjhelete tsa dikgothaletso tlasa mmuso wa 
kgethollo le tshebediso ya lefatshe lohle ya moraonyana tjena ya letlole la ntshetsopele 
ya lebatowa. Ho na le ngangisano ya hore ho na le tsepamiso e tshesanyane e beilweng 
ho matlole a kgothaletso a lebatowa a emetseng mokgwa wa kgalekgale wa kgopolo 
ya lebatowa esitana le phethehatso ya ntshetsopele ya lebatowa. Ho buisana ka ho sa 
lekalekaneng ho batsi ho etsahalang lefapheng la moruo Afrika Borwa ya kajeno ho a 
hlokeha ho hokela tshebediso ya matlole a ntshetsopele ya lebatowa ho moralo o motjha 
wa ntshetsopele ya lebatowa. Setshwantshong sena, letlole la ntshetsopele ya lebatowa 
ha e sa hlole e le letlole la tse shebaneng le tsa kgwebo feela le theilweng hodima tlhahiso. 
Ho ena le hore ho be jwalo, letlole lena la lebatowa le hlalositswe hape e le motjha wa ho 
tshehetsa bonamodi bo matla ho mafapha a mangatangata ebile a lebeletswe ho bopa 
(haha) tlhodiso ya lebatowa.




Pickles & Woods, 1992). The workings of 
this policy have been closely scrutinised 
with several observers viewing it as a 
failed attempt at regional development 
(Dewar, Todes & Watson, 1986; Wellings 
& Black, 1986a; Wellings & Black, 1986b; 
Wellings & Black, 1987; Rogerson, 1988). 
Subsequent assessments undertaken 
in the 1990s, however, point to certain 
positive impacts of the policy and 
even of the existence of ‘little victo-
ries’ achieved in terms of continued 
industrial growth taking root at certain 
localities (Driver & Platzky, 1992; Platzky, 
1995; Hart & Todes, 1997). 
The importance of regional issues and 
planning has revived in South Africa in 
recent years, to a large extent as a re-
sult of the release of the National Spatial 
Development Perspective (NSDP) in 
2003. This document clearly identified 
that there are spatial economic in-
equalities in the country which need to 
be addressed by means of appropriate 
interventions. The document identified 
areas of development potential and 
provided a point for reference in terms 
of issues of economic intervention and 
development. From 2006 a re-kindling of 
interest is evident on behalf of national 
government concerning questions of 
regional development (Nel & Rogerson, 
2009). This renewed interest is reflected, 
for example, in the publication by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
in 2006 of the (draft) regional industrial 
development strategy (RIDS). Essentially 
this policy is viewed as the “DTI’s 
attempt to respond to calls for support-
ing forms of industrial development in 
impoverished areas of the country” 
(Robbins, 2008: 6). The (draft) Regional 
Industrial Development Strategy explic-
itly identifies the future introduction of 
a regional industrial development fund 
(South Africa. Department of Trade 
and Industry, 2006: 68). Further signals 
of a growing interest in regional funds 
emanate from Department of Trade 
and Industry statements that a potential 
new regional fund “would enable the 
developmental state to strategically 
intervene to facilitate regional and local 
economic development, and assist in 
helping the under-developed regions 
reach their full economic development 
potential” (South Africa. Department 
of Trade and Industry, 2009: 1). It is 
significant also that in response to the 
limited progress of local economic de-
velopment throughout much of South 
Africa, during 2009 the Department 
of Cooperative Governance recom-
mended that “incentives for regional 
and local economic development 
should be reviewed” (South Africa. 
Department of Cooperative 
Governance, 2009: 98). In addition, 
during 2009-2010 the Department of 
Trade and Industry commissioned both 
a think piece and research on options 
for regional development funding. 
Interviews conducted with senior DTI 
officials in February 2010 confirm that a 
regional industrial development fund is 
currently under policy consideration.
Overall, by end-2010 with another 
round of reassessments taking place 
also on the directions for national Local 
Economic Development planning, 
the arena of spatial policy was in flux. 
Essentially, the fluidity of the policy 
environment is about changing the 
directions of ‘the developmental state’ 
in South Africa, in particular following 
the global financial crisis (South Africa, 
2010: 4). It is evident that post-2009 
the new government has expressed 
a commitment to long-term planning 
and coordination which is reflected 
in the creation of a National Planning 
Commission and the launch of the New 
Growth Path (see The Presidency 2009; 
South Africa, 2010; Turok, 2010). The New 
Growth Path announced that “Creating 
more and better jobs must lie at the 
heart of any strategy to fight poverty, 
reduce inequalities and address rural 
underdevelopment” (South Africa, 
2010: 3). In terms of the implications for 
spatial policy little is directly stated in 
existing available documentation. The 
New Growth Path makes a (re)commit-
ment to address spatial inequalities at 
inter- and intra-urban scales with special 
mention of the spatial divide inher-
ited from the apartheid era between 
the metropolitan areas and “the 
densely settled rural areas of the former 
Bantustans” (South Africa, 2010: 30). 
The specific role of regional policy may 
become clearer with promises made 
of a forthcoming “spatial economic 
strategy” which will “indicate how the 
job drivers affect different provinces, 
municipalities and rural areas, linking in 
to the rural development strategy and 
industrial policies” (South Africa, 2010: 
30). Additional clarity may emerge from 
commitments to “develop a realistic 
spatial perspective on long-term set-
tlement patterns and opportunities for 
employment creation and economic 
development” (South Africa, 2010: 30) 
as well as a forthcoming implementa-
tion plan for “spatial development 
within South Africa” (South Africa, 2010: 
32).
It is against this fluid policy background 
concerning spatial development in 
South Africa and of a renewed interest 
in establishing a regional development 
fund in South Africa that it is appropriate 
both to briefly examine the country’s 
past experience of using regional 
development funds and to look forward 
and build on the international lessons 
of ‘good practice’ in the potential 
application of regional funds. The 
discussion is presented in three major 
sections. First, a critical historical review 
is undertaken of the apartheid period 
during which South Africa introduced 
what was described as the world’s most 
generous programme of incentives for 
regional development (Rogerson, 1994: 
110). Attention is confined mainly to the 
apartheid period as this represents the 
period when a direct regional develop-
ment fund was in operation. In the 
second section the changing context 
of regional development and of the 
redefinition of regional funds is exam-
ined from the perspective of the Global 
North. Thirdly, attention turns to the 
application of targeted regional incen-
tives and funds for supporting regional 
development drawing on a range of 
experiences from the Global South. The 
conclusion offers a caution for South 
African policymakers to avoid past 
mistakes and instead to draw strength 
from new regional theory concerning 
the use of regional development funds 
for supporting regional development.
2. RE-VISITING REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT FUNDS 
UNDER APARTHEID
Although regional development pro-
grammes in South Africa date back to 
the 1930s, the most energetic initiatives 
were those launched during the 1980s 
in support of apartheid programming 
(Rogerson, 1988: 235). In particular, 
between 1979 and 1981 government 
sought to galvanise support from the 
private sector for its project of indus-
trial decentralisation and for regional 
development as a whole (Tomlinson & 
Hyslop, 1986). Of special note were two 
high-profile gatherings of government 
bureaucrats, technocrats and leading 
representatives of capital which were 
held in 1979 at Johannesburg’s Carlton 
Hotel and at the Good Hope Centre 
in Cape Town in 1981. The outcome of 
these gatherings was announced in 
1981 as a “new development strategy 
for Southern Africa” (Rogerson, 1988: 
235).
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Within this new framework for devel-
opment planning, national govern-
ment sought vigorously to further its 
long-established goals of promoting 
industrial decentralisation and deflect 
manufacturers away from the existing 
four metropolitan areas – and, in par-
ticular, from the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-
Vereeniging (PWV) region – towards 
a set of designated ‘growth centres’ 
and ‘growth points’ in less developed 
regions of the country, as described by 
Dewar et al. (1986); Wellings & Black 
(1986a); Wellings & Black (1986b); 
Tomlinson & Addleson (1987); Wellings 
& Black (1987); Pickles (1991), and 
Rogerson (1994). The number of locali-
ties which were designated for support 
increased markedly. This development 
undoubtedly would be one factor in the 
long-term ‘failure’ of the programme. 
Essentially, South Africa was applying 
its own apartheid-warped variation 
of the strategy of ‘growth centre’ 
planning. The details of this growth 
centre planning under apartheid have 
been detailed in several investigations 
(Tomlinson & Hyslop, 1986; Wellings & 
Black, 1986b; Dewar, 1987; Pickles & 
Woods, 1992).
Growth centre planning is underpinned 
by the theory of ‘growth poles’ or lead 
activities which would trigger growth at 
particular localities (Parr, 1999: 1195-
1197). The planning of growth centres 
was a well-established international ap-
proach towards regional development 
planning in the 1970s and 1980s (Dewar, 
1987: 160). Its essential notion was to 
concentrate government resources 
(through infrastructure and incentives) 
at select locations with economic po-
tential and use government support to 
develop the select localities to a point 
at which their growth would be ‘self-
sustaining’ and thus no longer require 
government support as leverage. It was 
important that the selected locations as 
‘growth centres’ be chosen on the basis 
of demonstrated economic potential as 
opposed to simply political considera-
tions. Consensus among international 
regional planning scholars was that, 
given the complexities of growth pole 
planning, it was prudent to concentrate 
government funding upon only a small 
number of localities – maybe two to 
four at maximum. From 1982, however, 
South Africa began planning for the 
sustainability of what might have been 
the world record for planned ‘growth 
centres’. Under the 1982 strategy, incen-
tives were to be available theoretically 
at 49 so-called Industrial Development 
Points and eleven deconcentration 
points. The vast majority of these growth 
centres had ‘not’ been determined on 
economic grounds but instead their 
selection was influenced by political 
considerations. The inevitable conse-
quence was that whatever funding was 
made available for regional develop-
ment, funding was spread so thinly that 
its impact was insufficient for any one 
of the selected growth centres (even 
those with economic potential) to 
reach a desired state of cumulative or 
‘self-sustaining’ growth (Rogerson, 1994: 
110).
As Dewar (1987: 164) points out, 
internationally it was generally rec-
ognised that in order to initiate the 
development of growth centres “the 
provision of some form of economic 
incentive is necessary.” The rationale for 
incentives is “to overcome the ‘initial’ 
disadvantages of a new location which 
exist prior to the build-up of urban ag-
glomeration economies” (Dewar, 1987: 
164). The international consensus was 
that incentives should be specifically 
tailored to attract the leading investors 
or ‘growth pole’ industry. In addition, 
the incentives would be temporary and 
“removed as soon as growth processes 
have been initiated” (Dewar, 1987: 164). 
Nevertheless, as argued by Wellings 
& Black (1986a) and Wellings & Black 
(1986b), the South African practice 
departed from international ‘good 
practice’ in certain major respects 
and these departures had important 
consequences for the track record of 
the policy as a whole.
First, incentives were not designed for 
the specific requirement of particular 
industries (Dewar, 1987). Rather, they 
were applied in a generic fashion to all 
types of manufacturing and all aspects 
of the production process. The interna-
tional experience shows that a non-
discriminatory incentive system mainly 
attracts industries that are either ‘lame 
ducks’ or branch plants (Dewar, 1987: 
165). The former represent industries that 
have been attracted only on the basis 
of the incentives on offer. The problem 
with branch plants is often that they 
have a limited catalytic impact on wel-
fare in the recipient location due to the 
fact that most production is in the form 
of ‘routinised processes’ which require, 
at best, low skill (and low-paid) workers. 
In addition, a further problem is that 
during times of economic downturn, 
branch plants are often the first facto-
ries either to be closed down or to have 
their production downsized. All these 
problems were reflected in the experi-
ence of those decentralised areas of 
South Africa which received generous 
incentives in the 1980s. The weaknesses 
of decentralisation planning have been 
catalogued and reviewed in several 
studies (Wellings & Black, 1986a; Wellings 
& Black, 1986b; Wellings & Black, 1987; 
Pickles, 1991; Pickles & Woods, 1992; 
Phalatse, 2001a; Phalatse, 2001b). For 
example, at Butterworth, the majority of 
the industries attracted to this Transkei 
industrial growth point had headquarter 
offices outside the region and less than 
one-third were ‘independent’ enter-
prises. Moreover, linkages of these plants 
to the rest of the locality were limited 
such that overall multiplier effects were 
minimal (Dewar, 1987: 165).
A second departure from interna-
tional good practice with incentive 
programmes was that in South Africa, 
many of the companies that were 
attracted to decentralised growth 
points were, in many respects, depend-
ent upon them. Using the example 
of Butterworth, Dewar (1987: 165-167) 
showed that nearly two-thirds of firms 
ranked the availability of concessions as 
the most important reason for selecting 
Butterworth for their plant location. 
This finding is indicative of the ‘lame 
duck’ syndrome of investors which were 
mobile, to the extent that their location 
choice was based only on incentive 
availability. Once again, this points to 
problems in the design of the incen-
tives which were non-discriminatory 
and simply sought to attract any type 
of industrial investor irrespective of 
appropriateness or their short- or long-
term multiplier impact for the locality 
or region (Dewar, 1987: 165). Another 
problem with the non-discriminatory 
nature of incentives was that desired 
cumulative growth processes through 
inter-industry linkages were not emerg-
ing (Rogerson, 1994: 110). 
As has been documented in a range 
of studies, investors at the growth 
centres could qualify for a range of 
different forms of incentives as was the 
case in the pre-1982 period (Wellings 
& Black, 1986a; Tomlinson & Addleson, 
1987; Pickles & Woods 1992; Platzky, 
1995). After 1982, however, greatest 
significance attached to a differenti-
ated system of cash payments that 
would be paid to companies and 
based upon the numbers of workers 
that were hired. The value of these 
cash payments was geographically 
differentiated across the various regions 
on the basis of ‘prioritised need’ on the 
SSB/TRP/MDM 2010(57)
16
grounds of existing levels of unemploy-
ment. The highest levels of incentives 
were made available to investors in 
those regions with the highest unem-
ployment and thus highest needs, such 
that the growth centres in several of 
the Homelands received the largest 
incentive payments. Enterprises could 
qualify for a guaranteed cash payment 
on a monthly basis for each worker that 
was hired. The level of agreed incen-
tives was guaranteed to investors for a 
period of seven years (Rogerson, 1988: 
237). In an international comparative 
analysis, these labour incentives (along 
with other packages of grants and sup-
port for subsidised rentals or relocation 
costs) in South Africa were viewed as 
extraordinarily generous (Cobbett, 1987; 
Rogerson, 1994: 110).
In many parts of South Africa, given 
the weak basis for labour organisation, 
the incentives for which firms could 
qualify were at or even above the level 
of wages paid to low-skilled workers. 
Incentive packages reached the 
point at which unscrupulous investors 
could simply ‘farm’ labour and thus 
theoretically make guaranteed profits 
at growth centres without producing or 
manufacturing anything at all. In other 
words, the amount of wages paid out 
to certain types of workers at growth 
points was less than the monthly cash 
payment that enterprises received (and 
was guaranteed for seven years) by the 
state. Abuses of the incentive system 
were increasingly exposed in the 1980s. 
Reports appeared of industrial estates in 
the Ciskei where little production seem-
ingly was taking place (Rogerson, 1988: 
237)! Worker exploitation, dehumanising 
work environments and cheating of the 
state incentive system were widespread 
in many of the Homeland growth 
centres. Some of the worst worker 
abuses were documented by Cobbett 
(1987) at Botshabelo in the Free State. 
Women workers, who often are the most 
marginalised and readily exploitable 
category of labour, were particularly 
vulnerable to the exploitative practices 
that were opened up for manufacturing 
capital to take advantage of labour 
at the Homeland growth centres in 
the 1980s as shown in works by several 
researchers (Hirsch, 1987; Pickles, 1991; 
Fairhurst & Phalatse, 1999; Phalatse, 
2001a; Phalatse, 2001b).
Overall, the effects of South Africa’s 
industrial decentralisation programme 
and the impacts of the generous 
incentive systems for manufacturers 
introduced from 1982 generated much 
controversy (Bell, 1986; Wellings & Black, 
1986a; Wellings & Black, 1986b; Wellings 
& Black, 1987; Bell, 1987a; Bell, 1987b; 
Platzky, 1993; Platzky, 1994; Platzky, 
1995; Bell, 1997; Hart & Todes 1997; 
Fairhurst & Phalatse, 1999). At the heart 
of the debate was the so-termed ‘Bell 
hypothesis’ put forward by the econo-
mist Trevor Bell (1986, 1987a & 1987b). 
In several works, Bell (1986, 1987a & 
1987b) argued that the most important 
influences upon geographical patterns 
of industrial change in South Africa 
were ‘market forces’ rather than the 
influence of government intervention, 
including through the application of 
industrial incentives. Likewise, Wellings 
& Black (1986a & 1986b) wrote of 
debates between interpreting industrial 
decentralisation as a result of ‘spon-
taneous restructuring’ in response to 
market forces or as ‘tool of apartheid’, 
meaning linked to the impacts of 
government incentives. Spontaneous 
restructuring was related mainly to a 
process of structural adjustment occur-
ring in certain traditionally unskilled and 
labour-intensive industries in the face 
of enhanced international competi-
tion (Bell, 1997: 10). Lively debate was 
sparked by evidence in the 1980s that 
the proportionate share of national 
manufacturing that was accounted for 
by the four metropolitan regions (i.e. 
PWV, Metropolitan Cape Town, Durban 
and Port Elizabeth) was in decline. In 
corresponding fashion, the proportion-
ate share of manufacturing occurring 
outside the metropolitan areas, includ-
ing in decentralised areas, was rising 
(Rogerson, 1988: 242). The significance 
of Bell’s hypothesis was that it suggested 
decentralisation planning had to a 
large extent been ineffective, as the 
prime cause for geographical patterns 
of industrial change was ‘natural market 
forces’ (i.e. certain types of industry 
were moving away from the metropoli-
tan areas in any event). In addition, it is 
argued that the extraordinarily gener-
ous incentives on offer to manufacturers 
were an unnecessary drain on state 
resources (see Bell, 1997). 
The implications of the Bell hypothesis 
were profound and did not go un-
challenged. The works of Tomlinson 
& Addleson (1986 & 1987) involved 
extended surveys of manufacturers in 
decentralised areas. Their findings on 
the changing spatial structure of South 
African manufacturing suggested that 
“to downplay the role of the official 
decentralisation policy, as Bell does, 
is certainly premature if not incorrect” 
(Tomlinson & Addleson, 1986: 381-382). 
As a whole, the research of Tomlinson 
& Addleson (1986 & 1987) suggested 
‘modifications to’ rather than outright 
rejection of the core tenets of the Bell 
hypothesis. In particular, they contend 
that even if prior to 1982 a general trend 
towards decentralisation might have 
been attributed without the effects of 
state incentives, after 1982 the situation 
was dramatically changed. It was ar-
gued that after 1982 industrialists could 
not afford to ignore the very lucrative 
packages of incentives on offer in 
decentralised areas and, in particular, 
at the Homelands growth centres. 
This was reflected in the advance 
of what Pickles (1991: 68-69) termed 
‘factories in the fields’ and of peripheral 
industrialisation.
From the mid-1980s emerged a growth 
of criticism concerning the indus-
trial decentralisation programme and 
especially of the application of lavish 
industrial incentives designed to attract 
industrialists away from the metropolitan 
regions into the decentralised areas. 
The range of criticisms and arguments 
included the following:
The rising costs of the programme • 
to national fiscus in terms of funding 
for incentives to industrialists, and 
accompanying arguments that 
these funds might be better applied 
to improve conditions (housing, 
services) in urban townships;
The major beneficiaries of the • 
investment incentives increas-
ingly were foreign investors (mainly 
from Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Israel) rather than South African 
enterprises;
Little evidence existed at the • 
majority of growth centres of signs 
of growth becoming cumulative 
and thus reaching a point at which 
government support and leverage 
would no longer be required;
The fact that many growth centres • 
showed absolutely no signs of 
growth at all, especially those 
growth centres that had been 
selected on political grounds rather 
than economic considerations and 
demonstrated potential;
The argument that the whole incen-• 
tive programme was designed to 
prop up the state’s failing project to 
support and give legitimacy to the 
‘economic independence’ of the 
so-termed Homelands;
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The abuse of industrial incentives • 
by certain unscrupulous investors 
and growing scandals about the 
employment (‘farming’) of large 
numbers of non-productive workers;
Revelations about the exploitative • 
labour conditions endured by espe-
cially women workers in factories at 
Homeland growth points, and
Arguments from proponents of the • 
Bell hypothesis that the majority of 
industrial decentralisation shifts as 
recorded away from the metropoli-
tan areas were the result of spon-
taneous restructuring and market 
forces rather than the result of the 
generous systems of incentives.
Overall, a chorus of critics made the 
point that funding of the regional 
industrial development programme 
was highly costly, politically motivated, 
largely unsuccessful and wasteful 
of scarce development resources 
(Rogerson, 1994: 110). Accordingly, at 
the end of the 1980s, an official rethink 
on regional policy was launched. 
This was led by a panel of experts 
appointed by the Development Bank 
of Southern Africa. The findings and rec-
ommendations of this study produced 
a revision in the regional development 
policy and a substantial scaling back 
of the industrial incentive system (Bell, 
1997). Most critically, the revised and 
much reduced incentive system re-
moved the favoured treatment, which 
had been given to industrialists located 
in the Homelands (Rogerson, 1994: 111). 
The consequence was the phasing-out 
of incentives which, in turn, saw the 
closure of factories in many former 
Homeland areas (Phalatse, 2001a: 
149-150) The grounds for retaining 
incentives were now mainly to support 
the victims of apartheid planning whose 
livelihoods were threatened, as several 
former Homelands industrial areas now 
become ‘redundant’ or ‘abandoned’ 
industrial spaces in the post-apartheid 
space economy (Platzky, 1993; Platzky, 
1995; Phalatse, 2001b). As viewed by 
Driver & Platzky (1992: 11-12): 
In spite of all the criticisms of in-
dustrial decentralisation policy, 
it may not be helpful to dismiss 
it altogether. It has made South 
Africa different from other de-
veloping countries in that it has 
helped to slow rapid migration 
to a poverty-stricken prime 
city. It has provided some jobs 
– mostly for women, built some 
infrastructure, and given some 
people in the most remote ar-
eas independent incomes and 
exposure to industry. 
It must be acknowledged that not all 
peripheral localities which benefited 
from industrial decentralisation incen-
tives later declined after the removal 
of incentives (Harrison et al., 2008: 99). 
Investment in several areas remained 
relatively strong in part because of 
growing foreign competition which 
underpinned decentralisation trends 
based on competitive pressures towards 
low-wage areas, particularly in sectors 
such as clothing production (Harrison et 
al., 2008: 99). In certain places Platzky 
(1995) maintains that the leverage of 
incentives and institutional support 
occasioned the crystallisation of a 
more diversified, locally embedded 
and sustained growth trajectory setting 
these areas apart from the record of 
low-wage branch plant locations. 
The transformation of certain localities, 
which were formerly dependent on 
low-wage industry, into more diversified 
economies provides a challenge to 
the notion that investment incentives 
under apartheid merely nurtured the 
growth of branch plant economies 
in decentralised locations. Hart & 
Todes (1997) highlight the need also to 
understand the significance of certain 
‘local factors’ which impacted upon 
the continued flow of investment into 
particular decentralised localities, most 
importantly around the Newcastle/
Madadeni area of KwaZulu-Natal. 
Although decentralisation progressed 
here in the immediate post-apartheid 
period, the later research conducted 
by Robbins, Todes & Velia (2004) dis-
closed that sharp employment declines 
were in evidence as a consequence 
of heightened international competi-
tion. Indeed, alongside Babelegi and 
Dimbaza, among others, Madadeni 
is now one of several declining indus-
trial estates created by the apartheid 
government’s decentralisation strategy 
which are expected to be the focus 
of some infrastructure and institutional 
support upgrading with the implemen-
tation of support promised through RIDS 
(Robbins, 2008: 6).
3. CHANGING INTERNATIONAL 
CONTEXT FOR REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT
Internationally, the ‘playing field’ for 
undertaking regional development 
has changed radically over the past 
few decades and markedly so since 
the heydays of the operations of South 
Africa’s former regional industrial devel-
opment fund (see e.g. Pike, Rodriguez-
Pose & Tomaney, 2010). Among others, 
Tomaney, Pike & Rodriguez-Pose (2010: 
771) maintain that neoliberalism has 
shaped the international ideology of 
economic development and conse-
quently the pattern of regional devel-
opment across the world for the past 
thirty years. In accounting for the shifting 
context and associated theories of 
regional development several observ-
ers draw attention to the importance 
of globalisation as a force in altering 
the rules for undertaking regional 
development (Drabenstott, 2006: 123). 
Illustratively, Bachtler & Yuill (2001: 70) 
assert “there has been a fundamental 
change in all aspects of how regional 
development is conceptualised and 
how regional policy is conceived and 
delivered.” 
3.1 Historical development of 
regional development
Historically, the origins of regional policy 
are generally considered to be linked to 
government interventions undertaken in 
the 1920s and 1930s. For Bachtler & Yuill 
(2001) the United Kingdom is viewed as 
the ‘cradle’ of regional policy thinking. 
The British government established the 
first regional policy with the Special 
Areas Act introduced to offer incentives 
encouraging investors to locate fac-
tories in areas of high unemployment. 
Similar interventions using regional aid 
were introduced in parts of Scandinavia 
at the same time. Following the Second 
World War regional policies were 
revived with a broad policy canvas, 
namely that regional policy “would 
enhance national development by 
taking up employment slack in the 
problem regions whilst relieving inflation-
ary and other pressures in more prosper-
ous congested areas” (Bachtler & Yuill, 
2001: 7). The central focus of regional 
policy was ‘regional convergence’ and 
reducing disparities between regions or 
the so-termed ‘core-periphery’ spatial 
divide. Theoretical underpinnings of re-
gional policies were traditional location 
theories (Christaller, Weber) which were 
“concerned with explaining variations in 
the location of economic activity with 
reference to the attributes of regions or 
urban areas, such as the cost of land, 
transportation costs, market size and the 
availability of workers” (Bachtler & Yuill, 
2001: 8). Policy interventions in Western 
Europe were allied to influence these 
factors and involved subsidies to reduce 
costs of investment, employment or 
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transport and provision of cheap land 
or factory premises.
By contrast, in the United States awak-
ening regional interventions took the 
form of industrial recruiting with the 
goal of luring factories to depressed 
localities or regions (Drabenstott, 2005: 
online). This strategy was underpinned 
by export-base theories which exam-
ined regional economic development 
from a demand-side perspective and 
“posited that money must flow into 
a region for it to grow” and that the 
“only way to get more money was to 
export more” (Drabenstott, 2006: 124). 
Anchored upon these foundations a 
host of subsidies or tax breaks were in-
troduced by many states and designed 
to lure companies, usually industrial 
enterprises, to particular regions. As the 
United States’ experience of industrial 
recruitment was closely aligned to 
‘local economic development’ 
programming, debates about regional 
interventions to a large extent centred 
on the experience of Western Europe, 
where ‘national governments’ were the 
policy drivers. Across Western Europe 
approaches to regional policy were 
broadly similar. The central policy goal 
was spatial equity in terms of equalising 
geographical variations in standards 
of living, infrastructure or employment 
within particular countries. Generally, 
four sets of regional policy intervention 
were applied:
Infrastructure investment, especially • 
in rural areas;
Direction of state-owned or state-• 
controlled industries to problem 
areas;
Development controls on manufac-• 
turing activity in prosperous regions, 
and
Fiscal incentives in the form of • 
spatially differentiated grants, loans, 
tax concessions or depreciation 
allowances.
Overall, it is argued that despite this 
range of policy interventions, the actual 
policy focus was quite narrow as it 
concerned mainly influencing the loca-
tion of manufacturing activities. Policy 
design was top-down and done by 
central government which determined 
which regions qualified for assistance, 
mainly in the form of hard infrastructure 
and enterprise direct financial support 
(Bachtler & Yuill, 2001: 9).
3.2 The demise of regional 
policy and the rise of new 
regionalism
During the 1970s and early 1980s 
regional policy went into decline as a 
result variously of the oil shocks of the 
1970s and the onset of deregulation. 
Under the impress of neoliberalism, 
in the 1980s the political agenda in 
Western Europe moved sharply against 
active government intervention in the 
space economy, especially by the 
provision of regional fiscal incentives. 
Rather, the trend throughout both 
Western Europe and the United States 
was towards privatisation, deregulation 
and market liberalisation (Bachtler & 
Yuill, 2001; Drabenstott, 2005: online, 
2006; Tomaney et al., 2010: 771). 
Regional policy came under critical 
scrutiny and in many countries reduced 
in political significance such that many 
scholars began to speak of the ‘death 
of regional policy’ (Rogerson, 2009). 
Certainly, the policy goals of reducing 
regional disparities and promoting 
convergence were downgraded, 
budgets for regional policy were 
cut back and support coverage for 
‘problem areas’ was substantially 
curtailed. Accompanying the retreat 
of national governments from active 
regional policy intervention was the 
rise of a ‘new regionalism’ as reflected 
in the growth of a “new regional and 
local dimension to economic devel-
opment” (Bachtler & Yuill, 2001: 10). 
Planning practices in Western Europe 
showed a convergence with what was 
occurring in the United States, where 
national government limited its activities 
in spatial development and devolved 
greater responsibility for economic 
development programming to states 
and localities (Drabenstott, 2006: 125). 
In Western Europe, however, an 
important factor in ‘new regional-
ism’ was regional institution building 
which occurred in several regions 
as a by-product of political de-
centralisation and delegation of 
authority for economic development 
to sub-national authorities (e.g. in 
Scotland and Wales). Importantly, 
‘new regionalism’ was marked by the 
proliferation of ‘bottom-up’ initiatives 
for development (Rogerson, 2009). This 
influenced regional theory towards a 
much stronger focus on ‘endogenous 
regional development’ which led to 
a renewed emphasis upon the role of 
entrepreneurship and support for small 
and medium enterprises. In addition, 
both in the United States and Western 
Europe there was recognition of the 
critical role of technology support 
as decisive for regional growth and 
prosperity. Underpinning all these shifts 
in theory and policy was the advance 
of globalisation which meant that 
in circumstances of rapidly shifting 
global markets, regions were continu-
ally forced to find new competitive 
strengths or niches (Bachtler, Wishlade 
& Yuill, 2003; Tomaney et al., 2010: 771). 
As a whole, a dramatic shift occurred 
away from old strategies of regional 
development – using industrial recruit-
ment or financial incentives as drivers 
for policy – to newer strategies which 
focused more “on the region itself, 
namely helping entrepreneurs and 
skilled workers build on their strengths, 
innovate and seize new market op-
portunities” (Drabenstott, 2006: 123).
3.3 The modern paradigm of 
regional development
Since the 1980s there has been 
further consolidation of the theory 
and practices of what Bachtler & Yuill 
(2001) style the ‘modern’ paradigm of 
regional development. At the heart of 
the ‘modern’ paradigm is the building 
of regional competitiveness (see Pike et 
al., 2010). Under conditions of acceler-
ating globalisation, Drabenstott (2006: 
125) observes “regional economies 
must constantly create new value 
in global markets by exploiting their 
indigenous strengths.” It is stressed that 
in a globalised production environment 
“successful regions are those that can 
develop and maintain agglomeration 
economies in competitive sectors” 
(Bachtler et al., 2003: 7). From the 1980s 
new concepts relating to regional indus-
trial development began to emerge. 
The competitiveness of regions “was 
increasingly attributed to the ability 
to innovate, particularly within the 
context of environments that facilitated 
learning, interaction and networking 
between enterprises” (Bachtler & Yuill, 
2001: 10). New theories of regional 
development centred on innovation, 
‘industrial milieux’, learning, clusters and 
networks (Drabenstott, 2005: online; 
Rogerson, 2009). Importantly, it was 
acknowledged that “competitive ad-
vantage increasingly implied the ability 
and capacity of regions to facilitate the 
generation, acquisition, control and ap-
plication of knowledge and information, 
in the interests of innovation” (Bachtler 
& Yuill, 2001: 10).
Regional policy has been revived in 
the context of developing a more 
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sophisticated approach to improving 
regional capabilities and attributes. The 
policy response has been the consoli-
dation of “a new type of regional policy 
concerned with the strategic man-
agement of regional development” 
(Bachtler & Yuill, 2001: 11). Several 
distinctive facets of the ‘new approach’ 
to regional development can be 
discerned.
First, it involves a broad sphere of • 
action, which covers a range of 
different policy sectors including 
physical and economic infra-
structure, business development, 
human resources, tourism and the 
environment.
Second, national policies for • 
regional development encompass 
economic development in all 
regions rather than those spe-
cially selected for ‘regional policy’ 
purposes.
Third, the new approach is distin-• 
guished by a pro-active approach 
to development using a multi-
annual programme of measures 
which are targeted at the business 
environment for private sector 
development and upon ‘soft’ as 
opposed to hard infrastructure.
Four, the new paradigm embodies • 
a distinctive approach to policy 
implementation, “which is collec-
tive/negotiated, led by regional 
authorities and involving a wide 
range of partners from local govern-
ment, the voluntary sector, business 
and social communities” (Bachtler & 
Yuill, 2001: 11).
Five, the spatial coverage of • 
regional policy has been subject 
to change with ‘regional aid area 
maps’ becoming ever more frag-
mented as a result of “growing pres-
sures to designate areas which are 
not only disadvantaged but which 
also provide suitable locations for 
development generally and inward 
investment in particular” (Bachtler 
& Yuill, 2001: 15). Accordingly, the 
designation of areas for assistance 
has become a reflection as much of 
regional opportunity as of regional 
disparity.
Six, in respect of policy instruments • 
in Western Europe, regional grants 
represent the central element 
of regional incentive packages. 
Typically, regional development 
grants may support the develop-
ment of variously investment aid, 
business start-up support, training, 
business environment development, 
and development aid for small and 
medium enterprises.
Finally, it is important to understand • 
that regional incentives are “only 
a part of the business aid scene in 
designated aid areas” (Bachtler 
& Yuill, 2001: 17). Other support is 
available through rural develop-
ment assistance or aid for small and 
medium enterprises. Critically, the 
existence of these diverse funding 
opportunities has heightened the 
importance of policy coordination 
at regional level in order to achieve 
successful regional programmes. 
Above all, this places a premium on 
the development of well-articulated 
and quality regional and local 
strategic planning.
Of note is that a critical role in reshap-
ing contemporary or modern regional 
policy has been assumed by new ap-
proaches to addressing regional policy 
in the European Union. Faludi (2009: 
2) points out that since its formation, 
the European Union always has had 
a territorial agenda. For Stoquart & 
Schubert (2010: ii), the long experience 
of the European Union in territorial 
development “constitutes today a 
gold mine of successful experiences 
worth reflecting upon.” Indeed, of 
any national or international body, 
the most comprehensive, well-funded 
and thoroughly managed source of 
regional support is that of the European 
Union (Wishlade, 2009: 1-2). The recent 
history of the European Union clearly 
reveals one of its key hallmarks as the 
pursuit of defined regional strategies 
(Roberts, 2003: 1-24; Rodriguez-Pose & 
Fratesi, 2003: 7; Stoquart & Schubert, 
2010: 22). As consecutive enlargement 
has precipitated constant increases in 
regional differences, it is evident that in 
order to reduce gaps in development 
between regions and its citizens, “the 
European Union uses regional policy” 
(Iribas & Pavia, 2010: 99). The main 
purpose of this policy is considered “to 
speed up economic convergence in 
less-developed regions, to strengthen 
regional competitiveness and at-
tractiveness and to adapt, change 
and encourage the development of 
regional labour markets” (Iribas & Pavia, 
2010: 99).
Structural and cohesion policies 
are the key vehicles to achieve the 
objectives for regional development 
(Rodriguez-Pose & Fratesi, 2003; 
Wishlade, 2009; Stoquart & Schubert, 
2010). Lima & Cardenete (2008) assert 
that contemporary regional policy 
in the European Union is based upon 
two concepts: solidarity and cohesion. 
Taken together, these two concepts 
“aim to narrow the gaps of income and 
wealth between the poorer regions and 
countries and those that register a bet-
ter behavior in terms of European Union 
key indicators” (Lima & Cardenete, 
2008: 1445). Nevertheless, the challenge 
of achieving economic and social 
cohesion has to be contextualised 
within the overarching European Union 
priority of improving competitiveness 
(Bachtler et al., 2003: 3). The regional 
policy budget represented one-third of 
the total budget of 213 billion Euros for 
the period 2000-2006. One of the main 
policy instruments is the Structural Funds 
which account for 195 billion Euros with 
70% of this amount concentrated in so-
called Objective 1 regions where Gross 
Domestic Product is less than 75% of the 
European Union average (Rodriguez-
Pose & Fratesi, 2003: 7, 2004: 97). Among 
others, Bachtler & Wren (2006) point out 
that programmes comprise a range of 
interventions through a mix of financial 
instruments. At the core of bidding for 
structural funds is the preparation of 
fully costed multi-annual programme for 
regional development which sets out 
priorities and use of funds. The pro-
gramme approach focuses on ‘multi-
annual, multi-project, multi-partner 
contracts’ and includes economic and 
social analyses of the region, a strategy, 
set of targets, details on how local funds 
will match European Union funds, and 
an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(Bachtler & Wren, 2006). 
Against this background of a shifting 
panorama of regional theory and prac-
tice of regional industrial development 
as well as an accompanying redefini-
tion of ‘regional funds’, attention turns 
in the next section to analyse experi-
ences from the Global South in regional 
development. In particular, the focus is 
upon regionally targeted programmes 
and the use of regional development 
funds which have parallels to those in 
South Africa. 
4. THE APPLICATION OF 
REGIONALLY TARGETED 
FISCAL INCENTIVES
National governments in many coun-
tries have a long history of deploying 
incentives in order to stimulate the 
growth potential of undeveloped or 
lagging regions. Fiscal incentives have 
been widely applied to attract industrial 
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investors, in particular, and to stimulate 
the growth potential of lagging regions. 
Often the fiscal incentives were tar-
geted at selected localities or ‘growth 
centres’ which were designated by 
national governments as bases for 
catalysing development in lagging 
regions or established in order to 
function as centres for revival of a de-
pressed regional economy (Parr, 1999: 
1195-1200). The rationale for spatially 
explicit programmes is “to compensate 
for location specific disadvantages, 
such as transport and logistics costs, 
infrastructure conditions, factor price 
differentials and lower levels of public 
services and amenities” (Carvalho, Lall 
& Timmins, 2006: 7).
Despite their considerable fascination 
and enthusiasm among policymakers 
in both developed and developing 
countries, the detailed international 
review by Parr (1999) demonstrates that 
the strategic application of govern-
ment incentives to attract investors to 
select growth centres (or new towns) 
“could only be judged as unsuccess-
ful.” Likewise, World Bank research 
suggests that across the experience of 
the developing world “the evidence 
on the impacts of fiscal incentives is 
mixed” and that there is no conclusive 
evidence that such policies “have 
succeeded in transforming the fortunes 
of lagging regions” (Deichmann, Lall, 
Redding & Venables, 2008: 234). These 
conclusions are supported by a brief 
examination of the policy experience 
of applying incentives in South Korea, 
Mexico and Thailand. 
4.1 The experience of South 
Korea, Mexico and Thailand
In Thailand the dominance of 
the Bangkok Metropolitan region 
has long been of policy concern 
(Kmonwatananisa, 2008: 1-4). During 
the 1970s and 1980s national govern-
ment offered tax holidays to new firms 
locating in regions outside Bangkok. 
Nevertheless, it has been concluded 
that the “incentives did not result in a 
large shift of investment from Bangkok 
to regional cities” (Deichmann et al., 
2008: 234). In the Thailand case, the 
disappointments associated with fiscal 
incentives programmes were attributed 
in part to issues of poor design. At the 
heart of Thailand’s programme was the 
incentive of deductions from taxable 
profits. Nevertheless, manufacturers 
in regional cities faced persistent cost 
disadvantages, which significantly 
reduced the profitability of new firms. 
Moreover, the initial tax holidays were 
not a sufficient inducement to impact 
upon investor locational choices. Finally, 
the eligibility criteria were another de-
sign problem as they were based upon 
a minimum size cut-off (defined in terms 
of minimum capital investment, capital 
assets or production capacity) which 
precluded applications from small-scale 
or agro-based local firms (Deichmann 
et al., 2008).
During the 1960s and 1970s South Korea 
used block grants and other transfers to 
promote ‘balanced regional growth’ 
by seeking to divert industrial expansion 
away from the large agglomerations 
of Seoul and Pusan. As an outcome of 
these policies, whilst the dominance 
of Seoul and Pusan declined in the 
1970s and 1980s, growth continued 
just outside the boundaries of these 
two major agglomerations as well as 
in a group of small and medium-sized 
centres along the already developed 
axis between Seoul and Pusan. Most 
critically, it was concluded that the 
objective “of moving firms from the 
country’s large agglomerations to less 
developed provinces was thus not 
achieved” (Deichmann et al., 2008: 
234). Likewise, in the case of Mexico, 
national government has a distin-
guished history of using fiscal incentives 
to nurture industrial development 
outside the three largest agglomera-
tions of Mexico City, Guadalajara and 
Monterrey. Between 1970 and 1980 
manufacturing investors locating 
outside these cities were eligible for a 50 
to100% reduction in import duties and 
income, sales and capital gains taxes 
as well as accelerated depreciation 
and lower interest rates. Analysis of this 
programme suggests that “the impact 
on decentralisation was either insignifi-
cant or undesirable” (Deichmann et 
al., 2008: 234). Indeed, reductions on 
taxes in Mexico had minimal impact 
on location decisions and resulted 
potentially in lost public revenues. 
The objectives of a more ‘balanced 
industrial development’ in Mexico were 
achieved not by fiscal incentives but by 
a shift in national industrial development 
policy from that of import-substitution to 
export-orientation. With this national shift 
in industrial policy, a dramatic change 
occurred in the logic of industrial 
location. For export-oriented assembly 
work, the most favoured location for 
maquiladores was not Mexico City but 
towns close to the United States border 
which formerly were limited zones of 
industrial activity. 
Overall, in each of the cases of 
Thailand, South Korea and Mexico fiscal 
incentives were applied to shift growth 
and investment away from large metro-
politan agglomerations or cities towards 
smaller cities and lagging or peripheral 
regions. As a whole, the incentive pro-
grammes “were not adequate to offset 
gains from agglomeration economies 
and induce firms to start up or move 
to smaller centres” (Deichmann et al., 
2008: 234-235). Accordingly, a survey 
of evidence on the determinants of 
industrial location across a range of 
developing countries points to the 
general weakness of spatially targeted 
fiscal incentives as policy instruments 
(Deichmann et al., 2008). The empirical 
evidence confirms the theoretical case 
that agglomeration benefits, market 
access and infrastructure endowments 
in large cities outweigh the costs of 
congestion, higher wages and land 
costs. Cross-country investigations point 
to the conclusion that fiscal incentives 
rarely succeed. Such incentives appear 
to exert an influence only for business 
location decisions ‘among comparable 
locations.’ The dominant pattern of 
industrial relocation in the developing 
world tends to be within and between 
agglomerations rather than from large 
cities to smaller cities or lagging regions. 
The conclusion of a World Bank study 
is that instead of providing regional 
subsidies or tax breaks, policymak-
ers should focus more attention on 
streamlining rules and regulations in 
order to make regional or local busi-
ness environments more attractive 
(Deichmann et al., 2008). The impera-
tive to improve the local and regional 
business environment is reiterated in a 
number of recent works as a foundation 
for private sector support and participa-
tion in local and regional development 
(see e.g. Vietnam Competitiveness 
Initiative, 2006; Altenburg & Stamm 
2008; International Finance Corporation, 
2010a; International Finance 
Corporation, 2010b).
4.2 The case of Brazil
In the global South the experience 
of Brazil provides one of the few 
exceptional cases in the application of 
targeted fiscal incentives to achieve 
the objectives of regional development. 
Brazil is considered a case of national 
government according normative 
emphasis to ‘balancing’ geographically 
the distribution of population (Jones 
& Visaria, 1997: 4). As pointed out by 
Ogutcu (2002), while Brazil has five 
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major regional divisions, the country is in 
practice divided into two, namely ‘Brazil 
One’ or rich Brazil which comprises 
the south, south-east regions and the 
developed part of the middle west, and 
‘Brazil Two’ or poor Brazil which includes 
the north, north-east, and the state of 
Mato Grosso. In particular, as shown 
in works by Harber Jr. (1983), Ogutcu 
(2002) and Carvalho et al. (2006), 
Brazil’s ‘regional problem’ concentrates 
on the North-East, a region with a popu-
lation of 47 million rich in resources but 
with a level of economic development 
far below the national average. 
As industrialisation is the key driver of 
urbanisation and the dynamism of 
Sao Paulo anchored on industry, it is 
not surprising that deliberate policies 
of industrial decentralisation have 
been pursued using fiscal measures 
for encouragement. Brazil has a long 
record of using explicit spatial targeted 
interventions to enhance the prospects 
of ‘lagging regions’ such as the North-
East (Haddad, 1997; Carvalho et al., 
2006). As Haddad (1997) reveals, Brazil 
adopted a wide array of measures 
to foster industrialisation away from 
Greater Sao Paulo. Since 1988 it has 
been recorded that regional develop-
ment has “topped Brazil’s political and 
economic agenda” (Ogutcu, 2002: 4). 
Martine & Diniz (1997) disclose that while 
there is clear evidence of deconcentra-
tion of industrial employment outside 
the metropolitan areas, the trend of 
deconcentration has been more in 
terms of a geographical expansion of 
the dominant pole (Sao Paulo region) 
rather than an upsurge of investment 
and the rise of new industrial spaces 
well away from this region. Indeed, it is 
observed that entrepreneurs “appear 
to have chosen small cities – within a 
convenient radius of Sao Paulo but 
necessarily within the state of Sao Paulo, 
for purposes of industrial location and 
relocation” (Jones & Visaria, 1997: 16). 
Cheap land, aversion to labour regula-
tions and agglomeration diseconomy 
costs of pollution underpin the reasons 
for locating outside Sao Paulo (Martine 
& Diniz, 1997: 226). 
Regional development initiatives 
focused on North-East Brazil were 
triggered as far back as the late 1950s 
stimulated by government recognition 
of regional disparities and a severe 
drought in 1958 (Carvalho et al., 2006: 
4). The initial strategy for supporting 
the North-East was to catalyse a 
regional growth pole in the form of an 
autonomous centre of manufacturing 
by attracting ‘dynamic’ or ‘high 
growth industries’, including metallurgy, 
machinery, electrical equipment and 
paper. In order to encourage invest-
ment the Brazilian government applied 
a number of policy instruments including 
fiscal incentives and direct public sector 
expenditures in the form of developing 
industrial land and infrastructure. In 
particular, the government of Brazil 
invested substantially “in large-scale 
infrastructure to integrate the national 
economy and lower business costs 
in peripheral regions” (Lall & Shalizi, 
2003: 668). This programme of massive 
public investments in lagging regions is 
considered, as a whole, to have yielded 
“some positive results” (Government of 
Brazil, 2008). Of critical importance has 
been huge public investments made 
in telecommunications and improved 
road infrastructure. Lall & Shalizi (2003: 
668) argue that investments in com-
munications and roads integrated the 
North-East with the national economy. 
Nevertheless, these infrastructural 
developments also had perverse effects 
as they allowed firms from the South to 
access peripheral markets. It was ob-
served that enterprises “in and around 
Sao Paulo achieved greater economies 
of scale by reaching distant markets in 
the North and North East” and further 
that several “plants formerly serving 
isolated regional markets had to close 
because they could no longer compete 
with national firms in Sao Paulo” (Lall & 
Shalizi, 2003: 668).
The Brazilian experience of using specifi-
cally investment incentives to stimulate 
regional development, however, 
has been mixed. The Brazilian record 
confirms the weakness of national 
governments applying fiscal incentives 
‘by themselves’ as a means for regional 
development and points to significant 
issues concerning improving infrastruc-
ture in lagging sub-national regions in 
order to enhance their market access 
and by definition their attractiveness 
in terms of local business environment 
(Haddad, 1997; Lall & Funderberg, 
2004). In the final analysis, the ‘decon-
centration’ that has taken place in Brazil 
can be best described as “centralised 
deconcentration” as it “really involves 
expansion and strengthening of the 
dominant pole” (Martine & Diniz, 1997: 
220). The essence of Brazil’s fiscal incen-
tive, according to Harber (1983: 134), 
is “a set of captive capital markets” 
for the sectors and regions that are to 
be supported. Between 1995 and 2000 
investment incentive programmes for 
the North and North-East, funded by 
income tax deductions, averaged more 
than US $600 million each year but were 
shut down as a result of “accusations 
of mismanagement” (Carvalho et al., 
2006: 4). 
In addition to these unsuccessful fiscal 
incentives, however, another spa-
tially explicit programme has been the 
Constitutional Fund programme which 
was instituted in 1989. The record of this 
particular funding programme, which 
centres on the provision of subsidised 
credit, is considered highly favourably. 
One detailed analysis produced for 
the World Bank concluded that the 
subsidised credit offered to firms by 
the Constitutional Fund programme 
“worked in terms of industrialisation in 
the Northeast” (Carvalho et al., 2006: 
6). The Constitutional Funds programme 
goes back to 1989 when the Brazilian 
Congress approved three Constitutional 
Investment Funds targeted variously at 
the North-East, the Centre-West and 
the North. The core objective of these 
funds was to stimulate economic and 
social development in these regions “by 
extending credit to local entrepreneurs” 
(Carvalho et al., 2006: 7-8). Of note is 
that preferential treatment was given 
to micro- and small-scale agricultural 
producers and small-scale manufactur-
ing to encourage both the use of local 
labour and local raw materials. The 
financing of the Constitutional Funds 
came from receipts drawn from income 
taxes and taxes on industrial products. 
Funds are transferred from National 
Treasury to the Ministry of National 
Integration (which is responsible for 
regional development) which then real-
locates them to the operating banks, 
the direct channel for subsidized credit.
The major benefit operated under the 
Constitutional Funds is that of interest 
rate subsidies. It is evident that while 
market interest rates offered to private 
firms are 45% (2006) the Constitutional 
Funds “offer credit at 8.75 per cent to 
non-agricultural micro-firms; 10 per cent 
to small firms, 12.5 to medium sized firms 
and 14 per cent to large enterprises” 
(Carvalho et al., 2006: 8). For agricultural 
producers, the rates are even more 
favourable: 6% for mini-producers, 8.75% 
for small to average and 10.75% for 
large firms. With inflation rates running 
at 12.5% in certain years of the early 
2000s these interest rates were nega-
tive in real terms. The subsidised credit 
funds were differentiated by sector, 
investment size and credit record of the 
borrower. Between 1989 and 2002 over 
US $10 billion was channelled through 
SSB/TRP/MDM 2010(57)
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the Constitutional Funds in subsidized 
loans to investors in the three benefici-
ary regions.
For South African analysts, the critical 
point to observe is that World Bank 
research shows that the allocations 
and financing provided under this 
Fund “have, in fact, been successful 
in inducing entry into lagging regions” 
(Carvalho et al., 2006: 25). The conclu-
sion is drawn that these Constitutional 
Funds were successful and indeed 
yielded greater impacts in relation 
to funding costs as compared to 
other regional development incentives 
which have been operating in Brazil. 
Significantly, the Constitutional Funds 
are an anchor for Brazil’s National Policy 
for Regional Development (PNDR) 
which was drafted in 2003 and formally 
institutionalised in 2007. The National 
Policy for Regional Developments 
considered to reflect the priority which 
the Brazilian government attaches to 
questions of regional development and 
reducing inequalities (Government of 
Brazil, 2008). The policy has “the dual 
purpose of reducing regional inequali-
ties and unlocking the development 
potential of the Brazilian regions”; its 
focus is upon “injecting life into the re-
gions and better distribution of produc-
tion activities throughout the Brazilian 
territory” (European Commisssion, 2008: 
4). It is considered that as a State policy 
“the PNDR is being implemented in a 
manner that will enable significant re-
sults to be achieved in regional matters” 
(European Commisssion, 2008: 4).
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Despite their chequered history under 
apartheid, the establishment of regional 
development funds is once again on 
the policy agenda in contemporary 
South Africa (South Africa. Department 
of Cooperative Governance, 2009; 
South Africa. Department of Trade 
and Industry, 2009). The international 
experience confirms one key lesson 
of the apartheid period, namely that 
the use of fiscal incentives as a vehicle 
for regional strategy is unpromising. 
Indeed, a focus on regional incentive 
funds represents an element of, what is 
described elsewhere, as ‘old’ regional 
theory and of the ‘old paradigm’ for 
regional development practice 
(Bachtler & Yuill, 2001; Bachtler et al., 
2003). In addressing the widening 
imbalances that exist in the space 
economy of contemporary South 
Africa it will be necessary to link the 
application of ‘regional development 
funds’ to the modern paradigm of 
regional development planning. Within 
this latter framework, the regional 
development fund is no longer simply 
an enterprise-oriented fund focused on 
manufacturing. Instead, the regional 
fund is redefined now as a channel for 
supporting wider and more comprehen-
sive interventions across multiple sectors. 
These interventions are designed to 
build regional competitiveness and to 
enhance localised opportunities, often 
supporting locally crafted development 
initiatives which are responding to glo-
bal economic changes and challenges. 
Looking towards the possible introduc-
tion of a new regional development 
fund, South African policymakers should 
take cognisance of the recent experi-
ence of regional funds operating in the 
European Union and of the emerging 
experience in modern Brazil. That said, it 
is essential to be mindful of the specific 
economic and political contexts in 
which these ‘good practice’ examples 
have evolved and consolidated in 
respect of extracting policy lessons 
from these cases for South Africa (Van 
Zuydam, 1999: 4; Stoquart & Schubert, 
2010: 4). At the close of 2010, spatial 
policy is once again under the policy 
microscope as assessments are tak-
ing place on the directions of local 
economic development policy and 
new directions for regional develop-
ment are under discussion (South 
Africa, 2010: 32). In the final analysis 
the fluidity of the contemporary policy 
environment at the close of 2010 points 
to the imperative for fresh thinking and 
vibrant debate in South African regional 
planning scholarship as to recommend-
ing the most appropriate way forward 
for regional development as a whole 
and regional development funds in 
particular.
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